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OPINION

COWEN, Circuit Judge.

In this action for contribution under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601, et seq., ("CERCLA"), Witco Corporation ("Witco") asserts
its claim against: Jeanne V. Beekhuis (daughter of Dr. H. Albert
Beekhuis and executrix for his estate); Wilmington Trust Company
("WTC") (trustee of two trusts created by Dr. Beekhuis); and
Brandywine Chemical Company ("Brandywine Chemical")
(collectively, "the defendants").

Witco's claim relates to a parcel of land ("the site")
previously owned by Halby Products and Halby Chemical Company
(collectively, "Halby").

Dr. Beekhuis was an officer, director

and majority stockholder of Halby.

The site became Witco's

property in 1972 when Halby merged into Witco's subsidiary.
1977, the site was sold to Brandywine Chemical.

In

Thereafter,

because the site was contaminated with various chemicals, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") placed the site on
the CERCLA National Priorities List.
In 1992, Witco entered into a Consent Decree with the
EPA to provide for the cleanup of the site.

Witco now seeks

contribution from the defendants for the costs associated with
cleaning the site.

Witco's claim against Jeanne Beekhuis is in

her representative capacity as executrix of the estate of Dr.
Beekhuis, and its claim against WTC is in its capacity of
trustee, charged with the responsibility of paying the debts of
the estate of Dr. Beekhuis.
The district court entered two orders which are at
issue in this appeal.

In the first order dated May 20, 1993, the

court held that the CERCLA statute of limitations for
contribution did not preempt Delaware probate law.

In a second

order dated November 24, 1993, the district court held that the
Estate was entitled to statutory indemnification from Witco.
Although these two orders did not terminate the litigation, the
district court by order entered on November 29, 1993, directed
that judgment be entered on both orders.
54(b).

See Fed. R. Civ. P.

This appeal raises one issue of first impression at the
federal appellate level, and one issue of first impression in the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

The former is whether

the three-year statute of limitations established by Congress for
contribution claims under CERCLA preempts state nonclaim statutes
that govern the administration of decedents' estates.

The latter

issue is whether under CERCLA an estate of a "potentially
responsible party" can properly establish an indemnity claim
pursuant to Delaware General Corporation Law.

We hold that

CERCLA does not preempt state nonclaim statutes, and will affirm
the order of the district court granting summary judgment to the
defendants.

We also hold that statutory indemnification pursuant

to Delaware General Corporation Law is not affected by CERCLA,
and also will affirm the order of the district court granting
summary judgment on the issue of indemnification.

I.

Dr. H. Albert Beekhuis was an officer, director and
majority shareholder of Halby Products and Halby Chemical
Company, both of which were Delaware corporations.

Halby

operated a chemical manufacturing and distribution business on
land it owned.

In 1972, Halby was merged into a Witco

subsidiary, Argus Chemical Company ("Argus"), which subsequently
was merged into Witco.

Witco is a Delaware corporation.

Argus

continued to use the site in its chemical business until it sold
the site to Brandywine Chemical in 1977.

From that time until

the present, Brandywine Chemical has used the site as a storage
and repackaging facility for chemicals.
In August, 1985, Dr. Beekhuis entered into a trust
agreement creating two separate inter vivos trusts, with WTC as
the trustee for each trust.

The first trust, into which Dr.

Beekhuis placed substantially all of his assets, was to provide
for income and maintenance for Dr. Beekhuis and his dependents
during his lifetime.

It was also to provide his estate upon his

death with funds to pay debts and other expenses associated with
settling his estate.

The second trust was a residuary trust

which was funded by property remaining after the first trust had
been closed subsequent to the administration of his estate.
Jeanne Beekhuis, the daughter of Dr. Beekhuis, is the primary
life beneficiary of the residuary trust.

Upon her death, the

trust assets will be distributed to various charities.
Witco has been aware of potential environmental
problems on the site since at least June of 1985, when the EPA
requested information from the company in connection with its
investigation of the site.

In April of 1986, Witco received a

Special Notice Letter from the EPA inviting it to perform a
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) Report for the
site.

The EPA subsequently placed the site on the CERCLA

National Priorities List because it had detected various
hazardous chemicals, such as lead, mercury, cyanide and arsenic,
in the soil at the site.

In October of 1988, because of a

release or a substantial threat of a release of hazardous
substances at the site, the EPA commenced the RI/FS.

On October 28, 1988, Witco notified Dr. Beekhuis of his
potential liability under CERCLA.

Witco also requested certain

insurance information from Dr. Beekhuis and informed him that the
EPA had already spent approximately $700,000 investigating the
site.

On January 21, 1989, Dr. Beekhuis responded through his

attorney by providing the requested insurance information.
On March 21, 1989, Dr. Beekhuis died.

Jeanne Beekhuis,

Dr. Beekhuis' daughter, was appointed executrix of the estate.
Eight months later, after paying the debts of the estate and
after the Delaware statute of limitations for claims against the
estate had run, the trustee of the first trust placed all of the
property remaining in the first trust into the Residuary Trust.
Between the date of Dr. Beekhuis' death and November 21, 1989,
Witco took no action with respect to any possible CERCLA
contribution claim against the estate of Dr. Beekhuis.
On January 18, 1990, Witco wrote to the lawyer for Dr.
Beekhuis' estate, apprising him of Witco's potential claim for
contribution, and seeking the imposition of a constructive trust
on the estate's assets pending resolution of the environmental
problem at the site.

The attorney advised Witco that it was

premature to request the imposition of a constructive trust as no
claim had yet been asserted by the EPA against Witco.
On December 4, 1990, Witco filed in Delaware state
court a petition for a constructive trust on the assets in Dr.
Beekhuis' estate.
state a claim.

The court dismissed the action for failure to

In re:

Estate of H. Albert Beekhuis, No. 11,853,

1992 WL 5689 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 1992).

On June 28, 1991, the EPA published its Final Record of
Decision ("ROD") recommending remedial action for the site.

The

ROD recommended excavation, stabilization, backfill, and capping
of contaminated surface soil at the site.

In August of 1991, the

EPA notified Witco, Argus, Brandywine Chemical, and the estate of
Dr. Beekhuis that each was a potentially responsible party
("PRP") for the discharge of hazardous waste at the site.

Each

party named as a PRP was given the opportunity to participate in
the planned remedial process for the site.

Witco subsequently

executed a Consent Decree with the EPA for the remediation of the
contaminated soil.

United States v. Witco Corp., Consent Decree,

C.A. 92-93 (D. Del. April 9, 1992).

Pursuant to the Consent

Decree and the ROD, Witco has incurred remedial response costs
and expenses for the site.
After executing a consent decree with the EPA for
remediation of the site, Witco filed its claim and thereafter its
amended claim for contribution against Jeanne Beekhuis, as
executrix of the estate; WTC, as trustee; and Brandywine
Chemical.

The Executrix filed an answer and an amended answer to

the amended complaint asserting a counterclaim against Witco for
indemnification for all expenses, including attorney's fees
incurred in connection with this action, the civil action in the
Delaware state court, and any threatened, pending or completed
EPA actions, suits, or proceedings.
The district court granted the motions of the Executrix
and WTC for summary judgment on the CERCLA contribution claims.
Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 822 F.Supp. 1084 (D. Del. 1993).

In a

subsequent opinion, the district court granted the Executrix's
motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim against Witco for
indemnification.

Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, Mem. Op., C.A. No. 92-

301-RRM (D. Del., Oct. 22, 1993).

II.
A.

The district court exercised its jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201, and 2202, and under 42 U.S.C. §
9613(b).

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), in that this is an appeal from a final
judgment as to some but not all parties and issues involved in
the district court proceedings.

On November 24, 1993, the

district court entered final judgment on these two orders which
are before us for review pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

B.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that a
party is entitled to summary judgment where "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).

A

party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its
motion, and identifying those portions of the "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."
Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553.

Where, as here, the non-moving

party has the burden of proof at trial on the issue for which
summary judgment is sought, that party must make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue for
trial.

Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553.

Moreover, the mere

existence of some evidence in support of the non-moving party
will not be sufficient to support a denial of a motion for
summary judgment; there must be enough evidence to enable a jury
to reasonably find for the non-moving party on the issue.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 2511 (1986).

III.

In support of their motions for summary judgment,
defendants contend that the Delaware nonclaim statute, Title 12,
§ 2102, applies in this case, and is a complete bar to the claim
for contribution. Section 2102(a) provides, in pertinent part:
All claims against a decedent's estate which
arose before the death of the decedent . . .
whether due or to become due, absolute or
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated,
founded on contract, tort or other legal

basis . . . are barred against the estate,
the personal representative and the heirs and
devisees of the decedent unless presented as
provided in § 2104 of this title within 8
months of the decedent's death whether or not
the notice referred to in § 2101 of this
title has been given.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 2102(a) (1992) (emphasis added).
Defendants argue that because Witco failed to present
its contingent CERCLA contribution claim to the executrix of Dr.
Beekhuis' estate by November 21, 1989, eight months after Dr.
Beekhuis' death, the claim is now forever barred under the
Delaware nonclaim statute.
Witco contends, however, that the CERCLA limitations
period for contribution claims of three years from the date of
judgment or a judicially approved settlement applies to this
case.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) provides, in pertinent part:
(3) Contribution
No action for contribution for any response
costs or damages may be commenced more than 3
years after -(A) the date of judgment in any
action under this chapter for
recovery of such costs or damages,
or
(B) the date of . . . entry of a
judicially approved settlement with
respect to such costs or damages.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) (1988).
Accordingly, Witco argues that it had three years from
April 29, 1992, the date of the Consent Decree, to file its
CERCLA contribution claim.

Since Witco filed its claim on May

25, 1992, it contends that it is within the CERCLA limitations
period.

Witco further asserts that to the extent the two

statutes conflict, the CERCLA statute of limitations preempts the
Delaware nonclaim statute.
The United States Supreme Court in California Federal
Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 107 S. Ct. 683
(1987) has provided a cogent analysis of when a state law may be
preempted by federal law. The Court wrote in that case:
In determining whether a state statute is
pre-empted by federal law and therefore
invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, our sole task is to ascertain
the intent of Congress. Federal law may
supersede state law in several different
ways. First, when acting within
constitutional limits, Congress is empowered
to pre-empt state law by so stating in
express terms. Second, congressional intent
to pre-empt state law in a particular area
may be inferred where the scheme of federal
regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to
make reasonable the inference that Congress
"left no room" for supplementary state
regulation . . . .
As a third alternative, in those areas
where Congress has not completely displaced
state regulation, federal law may nonetheless
pre-empt state law to the extent it actually
conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict
occurs either because "compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility," or because the state law
stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."

Id. at 280-281, 107 S. Ct. at 689 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
This Court has held that in enacting CERCLA Congress
has not explicitly preempted all state law on environmental
subject matter, nor has Congress enacted such a comprehensive

scheme of regulation as to provide no room for supplementation by
the states.

Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 125-26 (3d

Cir. 1991) (citing Exxon v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 106 S. Ct. 1103
(1986)).

Thus, it is clear that neither the first nor the second

basis for preemption of state law under Guerra are present in
this case.
Turning to the third basis for preemption of state law,
we must ask two questions in determining whether a state law
conflicts with federal law: (1) is it possible to comply with
both laws, and, (2) does the state law stand as an obstacle to
the intent of Congress?

Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S. Ct. at

689.
Before examining these two questions, it is important
to note that federal preemption of state law is not favored.
This is particularly true in areas of law traditionally dominated
by the individual states.

See English v. General Electric

Company, 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990) ("`[w]here
. . . the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted'
includes areas that have `been traditionally occupied by the
States,' congressional intent to supersede state laws must be
`"clear and manifest."'" (citing Jones v. Roth Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525, 97 S. Ct. 1305, 1309 (1977), quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152
(1947)).

In an area that has been traditionally occupied by the

states, the court must assume that the prerogatives of the states
was not to be superseded by a federal law unless it is the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.

See Hillsborough County v.

Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-16, 105
S. Ct. 2371, 2376 (1985);

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331

U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947).

Indeed, for

preemption to occur in a field traditionally occupied by the
states, there must be a "sharp" conflict between state law and
federal policy.

See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S.

500, 507, 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2516 (1988).

Since probate matters

traditionally have been nearly the exclusive concern of the
states, there is a presumption against preemption of state law.

A. Is it possible to comply with both statutes?

The district court correctly observed that in this
case, it was possible for Witco to comply with both the federal
and state statutes.

The provision in the Delaware nonclaim

statute, Title 12, § 2102, fixing an eight-month period for
filing a claim against an estate and the three-year period for
making a claim for contribution under CERCLA, are not mutually
exclusive.

One can notify an estate of a contingent claim within

eight months of a decedent's death, and also file a contribution
action within three years of the date of a judgment for response
costs.

The Delaware nonclaim statute expressly provides for a

mechanism that can be used to preserve contingent contribution
claims under CERCLA.

If a contingent claim is asserted but is

rejected by an executor, the claimant may petition the Delaware
Chancery Court for an extension of the time within which to file
that claim.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 2102(c) (1987).

Witco knew in 1988 that it faced potential CERCLA
liability, and Witco believed that Dr. Beekhuis also was a
potentially responsible party.

When Dr. Beekhuis died on March

21, 1989, Witco had eight months within which to notify the
Executrix of Witco's contingent CERCLA contribution claim.

If

the Executrix rejected the claim or refused to consent to an
extension of the time to file the claim, Witco could have
petitioned the Court of Chancery to extend the time for pursuing
the claim.

Witco could have preserved its right to seek

contribution at a later date and thus comply with both statutes.
We recognize that there will be instances where a PRP
seeking contribution will find it impossible to comply with both
a state nonclaim statute and the CERCLA statute of limitations.
For instance, a PRP may not become aware of his or her own CERCLA
liability until well after a state nonclaim statute has run.
Nevertheless, for the reasons that we discuss below, we conclude
that preemption is not appropriate.

In the context of

remediating the environment, we believe that the issue of whether
a nonclaim statute stands as an obstacle to congressional intent
is the more important inquiry.

Thus, while under certain

circumstances a nonclaim statute and the CERCLA statute of
limitations can be at odds, we do not foresee a substantial
impediment to the aims and objectives of CERCLA by our holding
today.
B.Does the Delaware nonclaim statute stand as
an obstacle to congressional intent?

The purpose and objective of CERCLA is to provide the
federal government with broad powers to effectively respond to
existing and future problems associated with the disposal or
creation of hazardous wastes, and to ensure "that those
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical
poisons bear the cost and responsibility for remedying the
harmful conditions they created."

United States v. Reilly Tar &

Chemical Corp., 546 F.Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982).
Three district courts have held that in the probate
context, state nonclaim statutes stand as an obstacle to
Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA.

In Freudenberg-NOK General

Partnership v. Thomopoulos, 1991 WL 325290, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19421 (D.N.H. Dec. 9, 1991), the court without significant
discussion found CERCLA and the nonclaim statute in conflict.
Id. 1991 WL 325290 at *2, at *4.

After examining the legislative

history of CERCLA, the Thomopoulos court noted that Congress
intended CERCLA to be given a broad and liberal interpretation.
Thus, the court held that there was "little doubt as to Congress'
intent to preempt conflicting state statutes in responding to the
kinds of environmental hazards posed by" the site in question.
Id. 1991 WL 325290 at *4.

The courts in Soo Line R.R. Co. v.

B.J. Carney & Co., 797 F.Supp. 1472 (D. Minn. 1992) and Steego
Corp. v. Ravenal, 830 F.Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1993) relied primarily
on the Thomopoulos decision in their holdings that CERCLA
preempted the respective state nonclaim statutes.

We decline to adopt the holdings of Thomopoulos, Soo
Line, and Steego, but rather, we will affirm the holding of the
district court in this matter that Congress could not have
implicitly intended to preempt the Delaware nonclaim statute.
First, and most significantly, a state's interest in the prompt
settlement of its citizens' estates is particularly strong.
Probate law, like real estate law and domestic relations law, has
traditionally been within the province of the individual states.
Long-standing precedent recognizes that federal claims against
decedents' estates are subject to state probate laws and
procedures, unless federal law specifically provides otherwise.
See, e.g., Pufahl v. Estate of Parks, 299 U.S. 217, 225, 57 S.
Ct. 151, 156 (1936); Forrest v. Jack, 294 U.S. 158, 162-63, 55 S.
Ct. 370, 372 (1935).
Nothing in the language of CERCLA suggests that
Congress intended to preempt state law governing claims against
decedents' estates.

Section 9613(f) of CERCLA authorizes

contribution actions against "any . . . person who is liable or
potentially liable under Section 9607(a) . . . ."
9613(f) (1988).

42 U.S.C. §

Section 9607(a) in turn, delineates four classes

of responsible parties upon whom liability is imposed: (1) the
current owners or operators of a contaminated property, (2)
owners or operators of the property at the time of hazardous
waste disposal, (3) persons who arrange for disposal or treatment
of hazardous substances at the property, and (4) persons who
accepted hazardous substances for transport to the property.
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
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CERCLA does not contain any provision

that imposes liability directly upon the estates of those four
classes of responsible parties.

In light of the traditional

reluctance of Congress to preempt state laws which are of
significant importance to the states and traditionally within
their province, we decline to read into the CERCLA statute the
congressional intent to except CERCLA claims from state probate
laws and procedures.
Second, by analogy, we can infer strong congressional
intent not to modify state probate law.

Congress expressly

endorsed traditional rules of property descent by creating an
exception to the CERCLA liability scheme called the "innocent
landowner defense" under Section 9607(b)(3).

Under traditional

probate law, after a decedent's personal representative pays the
decedent's debts and distributes any remaining property to
beneficiaries, creditors who fail to file timely claims lose
their right to collect from the estate, and property distributed
is not subject to creditors' claims.

Under the "innocent

landowner defense," a person who inherits contaminated property
thereby becoming an owner and a potentially responsible party
under CERCLA, is entitled to assert the innocent landowner
defense and escapes liability.

Congress created this exception

to CERCLA liability in order not to disturb state law controlling
the descent and distribution of property.

It would be illogical

for us to conclude that Congress impliedly preempted state
probate law to expand a CERCLA claimant's right to seek
contribution against property of a deceased potentially
responsible party, when Congress expressly narrowed CERCLA

liability with regard to the contaminated facility itself (in
order not to disturb the normal descent and distribution of real
property under state probate law).
Third, we agree with the analysis of the district court
that Congress did not intend to modify state law governing
capacity of a party to be sued.
1089-90.

Witco Corp., 822 F.Supp. at

Section 9613(f) provides:
(1) Contribution
Any person may seek
contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable
under section 9607(a) of this
title, during or following any
civil action under section 9606 of
this title or under section 9607(a)
of this title. Such claims shall
be brought in accordance with this
section and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and shall be
governed by Federal law.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988) (emphasis added).
Congress clearly mandated that courts follow the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when adjudicating CERCLA claims.
Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
pertinent part: "The capacity of an individual, other than one
acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be
determined by the law of the individual's domicile."
Civ. P. 17(b).

Fed. R.

As a result, state capacity statutes, as opposed

to liability statutes, are not preempted under CERCLA.

See Levin

Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448, 1451
(9th Cir. 1987) (state statutes involving capacity to be sued,
such as statute governing the capacity of dissolved corporations

to be sued, are not preempted by CERCLA); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 746
(8th Cir. 1986) (in a CERCLA action, "[t]he capacity of a
corporation to sue or be sued is determined by the law under
which it is organized"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S. Ct.
146 (1987); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F.Supp.
1491 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (city could not pursue CERCLA claim against
distributees of assets of corporation dissolved in accordance
with state law).

Thus, following Rule 17(b), we must look to

Delaware law to determine whether Witco, at this late date after
the statute of limitations under state law has run, can assert
its claim against the Executrix.
Title 12, § 2102 of the Delaware Code is not merely a
general statute of limitations, but instead is characterized as a
"nonclaim" statute.

The purpose of the nonclaim statute is not

the same as a general statute of limitations which merely seeks
to avoid stale claims.

Rather, "prompt distribution of the

assets of the estate is the ultimate goal of the statute."
Estate of Holton, No. 4682, 1976 WL 5206, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug.
17, 1976).

The Delaware nonclaim statute terminates an estate's

capacity to be sued eight months after the death of a decedent
unless the claim or potential claim is submitted prior thereto.
The Delaware nonclaim statute makes it impossible under state law
for a tardy claimant to obtain jurisdiction over a closed estate.
Accordingly, the executrix of the estate of Dr. Beekhuis is not
amenable to suit for late claims, including those arising under
CERCLA.

Last, we conclude that for pragmatic reasons, Congress
could not have intended for CERCLA to preempt state nonclaim
statutes.

Preemption would be inherently unworkable.

The

district court aptly described the problem:
Consider the following example, which
illustrates the pitfalls of adhering to the
logic of Soo Line and Thomopoulos: A
decedent dies today and his estate is settled
within eight months; twenty years from now
the decedent is deemed a potentially
responsible party under CERCLA, thus
triggering the three year CERCLA limitations
period for contribution claims; a plaintiff
obtains a judgment against the decedent's
estate; in order to collect the judgment,
the money in the estate must be traced and
retrieved subject to the applicable defenses.
The possibility of a CERCLA claim arising
long after the settlement of the estate would
hang as a dark cloud over any such
settlement, thereby compromising the goals of
certainty and promptness in the settlement
and distribution of decedent's estates.
Witco Corp., 822 F.Supp. at 1090.
We do not believe that Congress intended to unsettle
estates and create the potential havoc which the district court
described.

It is merely fortuitous in this case that assets of

the estate of Dr. Beekhuis are easily traceable and retrievable.
We must consider the effect of our holding on future estates,
which may not be as financially intact as that of Dr. Beekhuis.
It is untenable that Congress intended to reach so deep into the
domain of state probate administration and use the heavy hand of
CERCLA to disturb and upset long-settled estates.

The position

urged by Witco would result in no statute of limitations being
applicable to CERCLA claims against long-closed and settled

decedents' estates -- except three years from the date of
judgment or entry of a judicially approved settlement under
CERCLA.

Such a rule would create pandemonium in the descent and

distribution of decedents' estates.

We decline to imply such an

intent on the part of Congress merely based upon a three year
statute of limitations for contribution claims under CERCLA.

IV.

The Estate requests that Witco indemnify it for all
expenses, including attorney's fees, it actually and reasonably
incurred in connection with (i) the defense of Witco's claims in
this action, (ii) the defense in In re:

Estate of H. Albert

Beekhuis, No. 11,853, in the Delaware state court, and (iii) the
response to the investigative and administrative activities of
the EPA with respect to the site.

The district court correctly

recognized the strong and clear mandate of the Delaware General
Corporation Law ("DGCL") in its order requiring Witco to
indemnify the Executrix for all of the expenses requested.
Witco is the surviving corporation in a series of
mergers that began when Halby was merged into a Witco subsidiary
in 1972.

The present suit is in effect a suit by a Delaware

corporation against one of its former officers and directors.
Witco has assumed all the liabilities of Halby through this
succession of mergers.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1991).

Thus, for purposes of indemnification, the rights of the Estate

must be measured as though Dr. Beekhuis had been an officer and
director of Witco.1
Section 145(c) of DGCL requires a corporation to
indemnify any director, officer, employee or agent of the
corporation "[t]o the extent that" he was successful "on the
merits or otherwise," in defense of any threatened, pending, or
completed action, suit or proceeding in which he was a party by
reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer,
employee or agent of the corporation.
145(c) (1991).2
1

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §

Section 145(c) is a mandatory provision that

Section 145(h) of the DGCL provides in pertinent part:
For purposes of this section, references to "the
corporation" shall include, in addition to
the resulting corporation, any constituent
corporation (including any constituent of a
constituent) absorbed in a consolidation or
merger which, if its separate existence had
continued, would have had power and authority
to indemnify its directors, officers, and
employees or agents, so that any person who
is or was a director, officer, employee or
agent of such constituent corporation . . .
shall stand in the same position under this
section to the resulting or surviving
corporation as he would have with respect to
such constituent corporation if its separate
existence had continued.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(h)(1991).
2

Section 145(c) provides:
To the extent that a director, officer, employee
or agent of a corporation has been successful
on the merits or otherwise in defense of any
action, suit or proceeding referred to in
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, or
in defense of any claim, issue or matter
therein, he shall be indemnified against

applies to all Delaware corporations and grants an absolute right
of indemnification in such situations.

See Green v. Westcap

Corp. of Delaware, 492 A.2d 260, 265 (Del. Super. 1985).
The indemnification rights provided by Section 145
"continue as to a person who has ceased to be a director,
officer, employee, or agent and . . . inure to the benefit of the
heirs, executors and administrators of such a person."

Del. Code

Ann. tit. 8, § 145(j) (1991).
The long-standing policy for the indemnification
provisions in the DGCL has been described as follows:
The invariant policy of Delaware legislation
on indemnification is to "promote the
desirable end that corporate officials will
resist what they consider" unjustified suits
and claims, "secure in the knowledge that
their reasonable expenses will be borne by
the corporation they have served if they are
vindicated." Beyond that, its larger purpose
is "to encourage capable men to serve as
corporate directors, secure in the knowledge
that expenses incurred by them in upholding
their honesty and integrity as directors will
be borne by the corporation they serve."
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del.
Super. 1974) ("Merritt-Chapman") (quoting Folk, The Delaware
General Corporation Law, 98 (1972)) (citations omitted).

Courts

expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually
or reasonably incurred by him in connection
therewith.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(c)(1991). Subsections (a) and (b)
refer to threatened, pending or completed actions, suits and
proceedings where a person is a party "by reason of the fact that
he is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the
corporation . . . ." Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(a),(b)(1991).

have interpreted these indemnification rights very broadly.
E.g., Heffernan v. Pacific Dunlop GNB Corp., 965 F.2d 369, 375
(7th Cir. 1992) ("Both the language and the purpose of Delaware's
indemnification statute support interpreting its scope
expansively.")
Witco argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment on the Estate's indemnity counterclaim because
there are material facts in dispute concerning the alleged basis
for Dr. Beekhuis' liability.

Witco contends that Dr. Beekhuis

incurred CERCLA liability by his own personal conduct, and was
not insulated from that liability by having set up a corporate
entity and designating himself an officer and director.

The

theory of Witco's complaint is that Dr. Beekhuis is liable for
his personal acts and thus, his particular title or role within
any corporation is irrelevant to his CERCLA liability.
We are satisfied that under federal law, Dr. Beekhuis,
as a director and officer, may be found personally liable as an
"operator" within the meaning of CERCLA.

See Sidney S. Arst Co.

v. Pipefitters Welfare Educational Fund, No. 93-1227, 1994 WL
198003 at *2 (7th Cir., May 20, 1994) (corporate officers and
directors may be held personally liable as "operators" within the
meaning of CERCLA and that this direct, personal liability is
distinct from derivative liability for corporate violations);
Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., Inc.,
931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991) ("CERCLA prevents individuals
from hiding behind the corporate shield when, as `operators,'
they themselves actually participate in the wrongful conduct

prohibited by the Act."); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910
F.2d 24, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting cases in which parent
corporations and shareholders were held liable as "operators"
under CERCLA); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical Co., 810 F.2d at 743-44 (Congress intended CERCLA
liability to attach to corporate officers).

Witco alleges that

Dr. Beekhuis personally designed many of the chemical
manufacturing and disposal processes used at the site and
directed construction and maintenance of a lagoon and drainage
ditch at the site into which chemical waste was regularly
disposed.

We acknowledge that these allegations may form the

basis of Dr. Beekhuis' personal "operator" liability under
CERCLA.
Nonetheless, the Delaware courts and legislature under
state law have chosen to provide broad statutory indemnification
protection in situations where a corporate officer or director
successfully defends against claims of personal liability that
arise from or have a nexus to his corporate position.

In

Merritt-Chapman, the claimant sought indemnification from
Merritt-Chapman for expenses incurred in successfully defending
against criminal charges of perjury and conspiracy to violate
federal securities law.

Merritt-Chapman, 321 A.2d at 140.

These

charges arose as a result of the claimant's position as a
director and officer of Merritt-Chapman.

However, the criminal

charges were not derivative; they were based on the plaintiff's
alleged personal participation in the conspiracy and on his
subsequent alleged perjured testimony.

The court nevertheless

found that the plaintiff was entitled to indemnification pursuant
to Section 145(c) to the extent that he had been successful in
defending against the criminal charges in question.

Id. at 141-

44.
Similarly, in Green, the plaintiff sought
indemnification pursuant to Section 145(c) for the expenses that
he incurred in successfully defending against criminal charges
that arose as a result of his position as vice president of the
corporation.

Green, 492 A.2d at 262.

The criminal charges

focused on the plaintiff's personal actions and involvement in
obtaining a loan for the corporation which the corporation used
to finance a buy-out.

Id.

Yet, the court did not find that the

plaintiff was precluded from indemnification because the charges
were based on his alleged personal as opposed to derivative
liability.

See also Heffernan v. Pacific Dunlop GNB Corp., 965

F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1992) (Delaware law did not preclude
indemnification of former corporate director for legal expenses
incurred in suit alleging failure to disclose environmental
liabilities in stock purchase agreement since director may have
been sued in official capacity as well as individually in
connection with sale of stock); cf. United States v. Lowe, No.
93-2634, 1994 WL 424243 at *4, (5th Cir., Aug. 15, 1994)
("[plaintiff's] CERCLA personal liability does not, without more,
void the indemnity clause [of the corporation's bylaws] . . . .
Indeed, if [the] officers or directors were not subject to
personal liability for acts or omissions arising out of their

corporate positions, there would be little reason for the
indemnity clause.").
In the instant case, there can be no doubt that there
is a close nexus between the lawsuits filed by Witco and Dr.
Beekhuis' former status as an officer and director of Halby.

A

remand is not necessary since it is evident that Witco's claims
against Dr. Beekhuis arise by virtue of Dr. Beekhuis' activities
as a director and officer of Halby.

Witco made no allegations of

self-dealing, criminal acts, or actions undertaken by Dr.
Beekhuis which were not performed directly on behalf of Halby.
Moreover, Witco has not alleged that Dr. Beekhuis neglected
corporate formalities such that we should "pierce the corporate
veil" and disregard the corporate entity.

We are satisfied that

indemnification is available in this matter as a matter of law
under Section 145 when the corporate agent has successfully
defended the action against him.

The order of the district court

granting summary judgment to the Estate on its claim seeking
indemnification will be affirmed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order dated May 20,
1993, granting the motions of the Executrix and WTC for summary
judgment on the CERCLA contribution claims, and the order dated
November 24, 1993, granting the motion of the Executrix on the
counterclaim against Witco for indemnification (both of which

were made a final judgment by order entered November 29, 1993)
will be affirmed.

